The recent days have seen a revival of the Moldo-Pridnestrovian line. The OSCE chairman-in-office, Sebastian Kurz, visited both Tiraspol and Kishinev, following which a meeting of the political representatives of the sides, Vitaly Ignatyev and Gheorghe Bălan, took place in Tirapol. They agreed to continue talks in two weeks in Kishinev. In spring, it is planned to hold a meeting in the "5+2" format in Vienna. Our columnist, Pavel Uvarov, analyses what this revival may result in.
All or nothing
It has become apparent that the young Austrian foreign minister, Sebastian Kurz, has got down to work with interest. At least, there is such an impression after his statements. He announced, as we have reported, that he was going to pay his first visit as the OSCE chairman-in-office to Moldova and Pridnestrovie. It is significant in itself. He also called the three priorities of his office, emphasising, in the meantime, that the main of them is "to dispel the conflicts in OSCE countries". He also noted that he wanted to have his own view of the situation in Moldova and Pridnestrovie.
Such an approach might testify both to his ambitions and the fact that the Austrian foreign minister sees the Moldo-Pridnestrovian settlement as a venue where something substantial may be achieved. Whether he will succeed or not will become clear in the next ten months. He may well succeed, especially if Austria really take active steps.
Sebastian Kurz will have to continue the work of Austria's "senior fellows" – Germany's OSCE chairmanship. The main outcome of this chairmanship was, as is known, the signing of the Berlin protocol last June. Should Germany preside over the OSCE for another year or two, it might achieve not only the signing but also the execution of the Berlin protocol. And now it is Austria's turn.
The reason why the protocol provisions were not implemented in 2016 lies in a rigid approach by the Moldovan government. We have already written about it, and not only we.
This approach still persists. And if Sebastian Kurz wants to achieve a result, he will have to combat this rigidity and various "red lines" artificially drawn by Kishinev instead of implementing the existing agreements.
Unravelling the tangle
So, what we have on the negotiating table now is the virtually non-executed Berlin protocol. It should have led to the resolution of some socio-economic problems lying on the surface. Among them is the apostille verification by Moldova of education certificates issued by Pridnestrovian State University, the recognition of Pridnestrovie-issued licence plates, as well as the resumption of full-fledged telephone communication between the PMR and Moldova.
If even one of these issues is resolved, Austria's chairmanship may safely take the credit for it. And even more credits if all of them will be resolved, given that in recent years the process of the Moldo-Pridnestrovian settlement has been in deep stagnation.
Besides the Berlin protocol, however, there have long emerged other problems on the agenda – for example, railway cargo traffic through Pridnestrovie, which aggravated right after Berlin's meeting in the "5+2" format in June. Tiraspol insisted on urgently addressing that issue back in 2016 and, of course, relies on its resolution in the first half of 2017.
Kishinev, in contrast, is promoting its own agenda which contains, for instance, such an item as the functioning of Romanian-language schools in Pridnestrovie. They belong to Moldova's ministry of education. But it is not clear, in the meantime, the essence of the problem – no one has hindered the work of these schools, over the past year at least (unlike the work of Pridnestrovian Railway).
Proceeding from what we have on the negotiating table, there are three "roads", three scenarios for 2017. The first is very optimistic: the sides and mediators will manage to execute the Berlin protocol or the greater part thereof and solve the railway communication issue. Austria in this case will have to make extraordinary efforts, but its chairmanship will be remembered and may even go down in history.
The second variant is simply optimistic: alongside the railway issue, the sides will resolve one of the problems stipulated in the protocol. But no matter how simple it may seem, this will also require many meetings in various formats.
And finally, there is a realistically pessimistic variant – Kishinev will continue hiding behind "red lines", behind the backs of the radicals calling on the authorities to avoid any concessions. As was the case in the summer of 2016. If Austria does not have sufficient influence, persistence and the so-called diplomatic luck, [the execution of] the Berlin protocol will be inherited by Italy, which will assume the OSCE chairmanship in 2018.
Pitfalls
There is yet another danger facing the Austrian chairmanship. According to statements by Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip, and partly by President Igor Dodon, the Moldovan side has an apparent temptation to start elaborating a certain "legal status" for Pridnestrovie. Pavel Filip believes "time is now ripe to start a discussion of political issues", unsealing the so-called "third basket" in the settlement. It is, however, unclear why the Moldovan prime minister thinks so. Nothing substantive has been put yet even in the first socio-economic basket, and he immediately proposes to deal with the most difficult one – the third.
But nevertheless, such is the desire of the Moldovan leadership. And Vienna will have to apply extra efforts from time to time to cut down Kishinev to size, to mundane issues, such as the Berlin protocol. Otherwise, if the negotiation process sinks in political conversations, the Austrian chairmanship is certain to fail
Pavel Uvarov.
